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Abstract 
This study explores the relationship between exports and productivity using a panel dataset of 
Egyptian manufacturing firms. Most previous studies using data from more developed 
countries suggest that exporters are more productive than non-exporters because the more 
productive firms self-select into export markets, while exporting does not necessarily improve 
productivity. We investigate if exporting firms are more productive than non-exporting firms 
and, if so, whether the productivity differential is due to a self-selection process or to the role 
of learning from exporting. We also ask if the extent of export activities matters for 
productivity. We find that both labor productivity and total factor productivity are 
significantly higher for exporters than for non-exporters. On average, labor productivity and 
total factor productivity are, respectively, 46% and 63% higher for exporting firms than for 
domestically-oriented firms. When we differentiate between pre-entry and post-entry 
differences in productivity, it appears that this export premium is driven by a learning-by-
exporting process rather than just a self-selection of more productive firms into exporting. 
This weak evidence for the selection hypothesis is a reflection of the importance of the level 
of development of destination countries. In contrast to exporters to OECD countries, exporters 
to Non-OECD countries self-select into export markets, signaling the importance of the 
technical assistance from foreign buyers benefiting the former exporters. We also find an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between export intensity and productivity, suggesting the 
existence of a “threshold of exporting”. These results are robust to controlling for additional 
firm characteristics and potential outliers. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of productivity differentials between exporters and non-exporters continues to 
attract the attention of economists and development practitioners. At the country-level, the 
exceptional income and productivity growth in countries with export-led development have 
been attributed to externalities derived from exporting, notably in the newly industrialized 
countries. Evidence suggests that international trade openness is one of the key factors 
explaining cross-country variations in long-run economic growth (see, for instance, Sachs and 
Warner, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999). Furthermore, trade policy is traditionally used to 
promote exports and boost firm-level performance. Thus, trade liberalization, by bringing 
domestic firms into contact with international best practices, provides them the opportunity to 
benefit from the technical expertise of foreign buyers and become more productive (World 
Bank, 1997).  
Although mounting evidence shows that exporting firms are expected to be larger and more 
productive than non-exporting firms, it is always unclear the direction of the causation 
between exports and firm productivity.  Two main alternative hypotheses are identified to 
explain why exporters might be better-performer firms than non-exporters. The first argument 
is the self-selection hypothesis according to which more productive firms self-select into 
export markets because they are able to bear additional sunk costs of selling goods in foreign 
countries for the first time.1 Sunk start-up costs include any extra costs of locating foreign 
demand and competition, establishing distribution networks, adjusting product characteristics 
to meet foreign tastes, regulations and standards (Roberts & Tybout, 1997; Clerides et al. 
1998; Bernard & Wagner, 2001). The implication of the self-selection argument is that firm 
productivity is the cause and not the consequence of firms’ export-market participation.  
The second argument is that firms learn to be more productive by becoming exporters, 
suggesting that the firm export status is a driver of firm productivity. The learning process 
may operate through a technical assistance from overseas buyers (Rhee et al., 1984; 
Grossman and Helpman 1991, p. 166; World Bank 1993; Pack & Saggi, 2001) or/and through 
the exposition to international competition (Evenson and Westphal, 1995). The learning 
effect, therefore, includes knowledge, technology, and efficiency gained from exporting. 
There is substantial evidence that exporters perform better than non-exporters but the issue of 
the direction of the causality between exports and productivity has only recently begun to 
attract attention. Beginning with Bernard and Jensen (1995), this recent strand of the literature 
documents the issue of causality between exports and firm performance.2 Whereas most 
studies considering more developed economies find evidence that the export premium is due 
to a self-selection process (Bernard and Jensen, 1999; and Clerides, Lach and Tybout, 1998; 
Aw et al, 2000; Delgado et al., 2002; Girma & al., 2003; Greenaway  et al., 2005), more 
recent studies focusing on less developed economies tend to confirm the learning effect 
                                                 
1 Firms also self‐select into exporting because the returns to doing so are relatively high for them (Clerides et al. 
1998). 
2 The first strand of the literature includes, among others, Chen and Tang (1987); Haddad (1993); Aw and 
Hwang (1995). 
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(Kraay, 1999; Castellani, 2002; Balwin & Gu, 2003; Bigsten et al., 2004; Blalock and Gertler, 
2004; Fernandes & Isgut, 2005; De Loecker, 2007; Mallick and Yang, 2013). 
Notwithstanding its valuable insights, the big picture of the weak evidence of learning from 
exporting is challenging on three important grounds. The first one is related to the cross-
country differences in economic and technological development. Indeed, lesser developed 
countries future exporters are much more likely to be less efficient than firms in developed 
trading partner’s countries. It is therefore reasonable to assume that firms in developing 
countries breaking into export markets are much more concerned with the learning-by-
exporting phenomenon than others. This is the reason why, in contrast to studies using data 
from more developed countries, most of those working on lesser developed economies find 
strong evidence of learning from exporting (Kraay (1999); Bigsten et al. (2004); Blalock and 
Gertler, 2004; Fernandes & Isgut, 2005; Mallick and Yang, 2013).  
The second point is the role of firm export experience, that is, the number of years in 
exporting.3 It also seems reasonable to suppose that not all exporters have the same history of 
involvement in export markets: recent entrants into export markets are much more likely to 
learn from exporting than established exporters. Similarly, while some firms only export 
occasionally, some others are actively and constantly involved in international markets. The 
third idea is that simply comparing exporters with non-exporters does not tell us the extent to 
which exporting improves firm performance. Some firms may export only very low levels of 
their export to output ratio, whereas some others export almost all of their output. This 
suggests that not only export-market participation improves productivity, but also the extent 
of the firm’s export activities is positively associated with firm performance.  
Another underlying missing link is the so-called “threshold of internationalization”. On the 
one hand, highly internationally engaged firms realize substantial economies of scale in 
exporting and access new and highly sophisticated technologies. On the other, an increasing 
international expansion may adversely affect firm productivity, due to vulnerability to 
external shocks. The association between exports and productivity might, therefore, display 
an optimal level of firm’s international involvement. 
The purpose of this paper is to revisit the link between exports and productivity, accounting 
for all these missing dimensions of the relationship. Specifically, we make four important 
contributions to the literature. First, we directly test the self-selection hypothesis against that 
of the learning-by-exporting using propensity score matching methods to remove the potential 
bias generated by confounding factors. Second, we make the first attempt to formally 
reconcile the two alternative hypotheses by highlighting the fundamental role of the level of 
development of destination countries. The underlying idea is that exporting to Organization 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) countries, for example, does not 
necessarily involve substantial sunk costs of entry into export markets because of the 
technical assistance provided by such importers. In contrast, exporting to Non-OECD 
countries or to poor countries might require sunk costs of entering the export market, 
suggesting that only the most productive firms are able to export to these countries. 
                                                 
3 This argument is in line with work on learning‐by‐doing developed by Arrow (1962). 
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Third, our study also offers important insight for the level and the extent of firms’ 
engagement in export markets. We consider that both the level of engagement in exporting 
and how long firms have participated in the export market matter for capturing the learning 
effects. We account for this by applying the generalized propensity score (GPS) introduced in 
this literature by Fryges and Wagner (2008) and Fryges (2009) to a lesser developed 
economy. In so doing, this study estimates in a same framework the propensity scores using 
not only a binary treatment—that is the firm’s export status—but also a continuous 
treatment—that is the firm’s export intensity. Fourth, we consider a relatively less developed 
economy, namely Egypt. Questioning the exports-productivity link in the Egyptian 
manufacturing industry is of considerable research interest in many respects. Egypt has 
experienced a high level of trade restrictions in the recent past, suggesting that both the sunk 
costs of starting exporting and the learning effects are much more likely to coexist than in 
more developed economies. The implementation of the trade liberalization beginning in 1991 
was followed by a rapid growth of the number of exporting firms.4  
We find that both labor productivity and total factor productivity are significantly higher for 
exporters than for non-exporters. On average, labor productivity and total factor productivity 
are, respectively, 46% and 63% higher for exporting firms than for domestically-oriented 
firms. When we differentiate between pre-entry and post-entry differences in productivity, it 
appears that this export premium is driven by a learning-by-exporting process rather than just 
a self-selection of more productive firms into exporting. This little evidence of the selection 
hypothesis is a reflection of the importance of the level of development of destination 
countries. In contrast to firms that export to OECD countries, exporters to Non-OECD 
countries self-select into export markets, signaling the importance of the technical assistance 
from foreign buyers benefiting the former exporters. We also find an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between export intensity and productivity, suggesting the existence of a 
“threshold of exporting”. These results are robust to controlling for additional firm 
characteristics and to dropping potential outliers. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a brief review of the 
theoretical and empirical literature. Section 3 describes the trade liberalization in Egypt, while 
Section 4 explains our empirical strategy. The main results of the paper are discussed in 
Section 5 and concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
 
2. Exports and Productivity: Theoretical and Empirical Literature 
 
2.1. Theoretical arguments 
Exporting firms are expected to be larger and more productive than non-exporting firms, 
mainly due to the self-selection of more productive firms into export markets and the role of 
learning-by-exporting (Bernard & Jensen, 1999a; Wagner, 2007a). On the one hand, the more 
productive firms self-select (randomly or consciously) into exporting because of sunk costs of 
starting exporting and financial constraints. Thus, only firms that can successfully overcome 
                                                 
4 The “El‐Infitah” or “Opening”. 
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these additional costs, or that are financially liquid, become exporters. These additional costs 
therefore represent barriers to entering foreign markets.  
The self-selection can operate either randomly (Melitz, 2003; Bernard et al., 2003) or 
consciously. The idea of the random self-selection is that trade exposure randomly causes a 
selection of the more productive firms in the international market forcing the least productive 
to exit. Regarding the conscious self-selection the basic insight is the existence of a rationality 
effect. Future exporters plan and prepare themselves to enter the export market so that they 
increase their productivity before facing international competition (Yeaple, 2005). The work 
of Melitz (2003) focused attention on firm heterogeneity in international trade and suggested 
that the entry and exit movements lead to a reallocation of market shares in favor of the most 
productive firms and an increase in aggregate productivity.  
Exporting increases expected revenue and the productivity threshold of survival in 
international markets. This leads to an exit of least efficient firms in a Schumpeterian logic of 
“creative destruction”, suggesting that exporting firms have to be more productive than their 
domestically-oriented counterparts. So rational, firms have the incentives to invest and 
innovate in order to increase their productivity when they anticipate entering the export 
market. Thus, the ex-ante productivity level depends on previous forward looking decisions of 
firms facing sunk costs of entering the export market.  
On the other hand, exporting improves firm productivity because exporters learn from 
international buyers and competitors. Foreign consumers and competitors transfer their 
knowledge and technology to domestic firms entering the export market, suggesting a 
transition from traditional technologies to modern technologies (Rodrik, 1988a; Grossman & 
Helpman, 1991; Clerides et al., 1998).5 Firms may benefit from the technical expertise of 
foreign buyers, notably in lesser developed economies. When the demand requires a certain 
degree of standardization or coordination, importers in developed countries provide 
technology to sellers located in developing countries. The reason is that production techniques 
in developing countries are not sophisticated enough to meet the quality standards of export 
markets.  
For example, the model developed by Pack and Saggi (2001) highlights the importance of 
incentives of buyers to provide technology to sellers. Developed countries buyers are willing 
to transfer knowledge to lesser developed exporters, although such knowledge transfer can 
diffuse to other firms and, ultimately, leads to entry into developed markets. Exporting firms 
may also benefit from exposure to the intense competition of export markets. The exposition 
to international competition forces exporting firms to adopt the most sophisticated 
technologies. Otherwise, they cannot survive in more competitive markets. In contrast to 
domestically-oriented firms, which often produce with increasing returns to scale, foreign-
oriented firms need to fully exploit economies of scale to survive in competitive international 
                                                 
5 Exporters may also be more efficient by reducing X‐inefficiency, while using the same technology (Nishimizu & 
Robinson, 1984). 
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markets.6 That is consistent with the study by Van Biesebroeck (2005) who finds that because 
of financial constraints and contract enforcement, domestically-oriented firms do not fully 
exploit scale economies.  
The leaning from exporting hypothesis is also supported by the theoretical models of firms 
export market participation. The argument in these models is that firms export only when the 
expected benefits of such an investment are positive. Another plausible story is that the 
exceptional productivity performance of exporters reflects a market driven selection process. 
Exporting firms with low productivity are forced to exit the export market and only successful 
ones will continue exporting. 
 
2.2. A brief survey of evidence 
Since the seminal paper by Bernard & Jensen (1995), an extensive empirical literature on the 
relationship between exports and productivity performance has grown. Wagner (2007a) 
reviews 54 empirical studies covering 34 countries that address this issue. The familiar picture 
is that exporters are more productive than non-exporters. The evidence suggests that the 
export premium is much more explained by the fact that the more productive firms self-select 
into exporting, while exporters do not necessarily learn from exporting. This suggests that the 
empirical evidence strongly supports the self-selection hypothesis against the learning effect. 
Let’s sum up the main findings in favor to the selection into export markets.7 Bernard & 
Jensen (1995) use a panel dataset of U.S. manufacturing firms over the period 1976-1987 and 
find that exporters have a third greater LP than non-exporters. The estimated export premium 
is about 15%. Aw & Hwang (1995), in the case of Taiwan, find that LP is 36% higher for 
exporting firms, as compared with their counterparts selling on the domestic market only. 
Furthermore, although Clerides et al. (1998) construct a model of export participation with 
learning effects, they find that the association between exports and productivity is much more 
in favor of the self-selection hypothesis. Using data from the Indonesian manufacturing 
industry, Sjoholm (1999) finds that exporters experience higher levels and growth rates of LP 
than non-exporters and that this export premium is increasing with the export to output ratio. 
Bernard & Wagner (1997, 2001), even after controlling for unobserved firm-level 
heterogeneity, find that future export entry is strongly and positively associated with higher 
productivity, mainly due to sunk costs of starting exporting. The same picture is found in 
other studies, with pre-entry export premia varying across industries and with the level of 
economic development (see, for instance, Isgut, 2001; Wagner, 2002; Castellani, 2002; Aw et 
al., (2000); Delgado et al., 2002; Hansson and Lundin, 2004; Aw & Huang, 1995; Liu et al., 
1999; Girma et al., 2004; Greenaway & Kneller, 2004; Greenaway & Yu, 2004; Bernard & 
Jensen, 2004). 
                                                 
6 Domestically‐oriented firms are often protected from international competition, especially in developing 
economies. Participation in international markets allows achieving economies of scale, mainly due to increased 
demand. 
7 These findings were summarized using, in part, the detailed survey of Wagner (2007a). 
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Regarding the learning hypothesis, with few exceptions, it is supported by much of the 
emerging literature looking at the trade-productivity nexus in lesser developed economies. 
The work of Blalock and Gertler (2004) emphasized the shortcomings of previous attempts to 
test the leaning-by-exporting hypothesis in more developed economies. They point to the fact 
that the traditional weak evidence of learning from exporting is due to cross-country 
differences in economic development. The underlying idea is that the learning effect is much 
more likely to be found in poorest countries, where future exporters have much more to 
learning from foreign buyers and competitors in terms of best practices and efficiency.  
Using data for the Indonesian manufacturing industry over the period 1990-1996, their results 
strongly support the learning hypothesis. Very similar results were obtained, among others, by 
Kraay (1999) in China, Bigsten et al. (2004) and Van Biesebroeck (2005) in African 
countries, Fernandes & Isgut (2005) in Colombia, De Loecker (2007) in Slovenia, and 
Mallick and Yang (2013) in India. Although the learning effects found in these studies vary 
with samples and estimation methods, the big picture that emerges is that exporting improves 
firm productivity in developing economies. 
In sum, with some few exceptions, empirical studies tend to find evidence for the self-
selection hypothesis in developed countries and for the learning-by-exporting hypothesis in 
emerging and developing countries. This could be explained by the fact that the learning 
effect is more relevant in developing countries than in developed countries where firms are 
relatively closer to their production possibility frontier. 
 
3. The Egyptian trade policy and manufacturing exports 
Since the initiation of the stabilization program in the early 1990s Egypt has implemented a 
gradual but progressive trade liberalization. Most non-tariff measures have been removed, the 
tariff protection has been significantly reduced, and the domestic sector has been reformed in 
a market-friendly manner. The Egypt’s average most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff fell to 
20.0% in 2005 from 26.8% in 1998. The number of tariff bands has also been significantly 
reduced since the 1990s.  
The government does not grant any export subsidies but promotes exports through an Export 
Promotion Law adopted in 2002. Although exporters need to be registered in the Commercial 
Register with the General Organization for Export and Import Control, no export approval is 
required. Unlike imports, exports are not restricted to Egyptian nationals. Regarding export 
taxation, Egypt does not apply any export taxes, charges or levies. There are no export quotas, 
licences, or prohibitions. Exports are not subject to any quotas, licences, or prohibitions and 
are also exempt from the general sales tax introduced since 1991. 
Various incentives are used to encourage export-oriented activities. These mainly include the 
promotion of (i) the establishment of free zones, (ii) the access to finance, insurance, and 
guarantees for exporting firms,8 and (iii) the market assistance through a number of 
                                                 
8 Since its establishment in 1983, the Export Development Bank of Egypt (EDBE), provides short‐ and medium‐
term loans to finance capital assets of exporting firms. It also provides bank guarantees required for financing 
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government agencies.9 The manufacturing sector is at the core of the Egypt’s export 
development strategy, although exports of petroleum and natural gas constitute a major source 
of foreign exchange earnings. Apart from agricultural products, the four priority areas are 
processed food products, textiles and garments, chemicals and pharmaceuticals, and building 
materials.  
These reforms, by introducing a greater degree of competition in the economy, have helped 
spur exports beginning in the early 2000s. The increase in exports has made a switch from 
chronic current account deficits to growing surpluses since 2000s (WTO, 2005). The non-oil 
exports has increased, particularly manufacturing exports, main driven by the tariff reductions 
for imported inputs and the New Intellectual Property Legislation entered into force in 2002. 
The sample period of this study is from 2003 to 2008, and therefore, covers the episode of 
exports expansion in Egypt resulting from the trade liberalization. The dataset includes the 
main manufacturing industries of the Egyptian economy (Table 1). The number of exporting 
firms, as a percentage of manufacturing firms, has increased significantly, moving from 20% 
in 2003 to 30% in 2008. As shown in Table 2, the generalization of the exporting activity 
occurs mainly in the garments, textiles, food and metal industries, confirming the overall 
structure of the Egypt’s export sector described by the 2005 Trade Policy Review (WTO, 
2005). 
Table 1: Number of exporters and non-exporters, by year 
Year Number of exporters Number of non-exporters Total 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
136 
185 
215 
259 
299 
329 
532 
572 
579 
663 
721 
737 
668 
757 
794 
922 
1020 
1066 
 
 
4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1. Measuring productivity performance 
In the empirical literature on the export-productivity relationship, the issue of productivity 
measurement is important. Productivity can be defined as the ability of the firm to transform 
inputs into output. Productivity is generally measured using partial productivity measures 
(output per worker, for example) or using TFP measures. TFP measures are often preferred 
because they allow accounting for the use of multifactor inputs in production. A basic non-
parametric measure of TFP comparing firms’ productivity can be defined by the profitability 
ratio as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
exports. The Export Credit and Guarantee Company, established in 1992 by the EDBE, supports exporters by 
issuing export credit insurance guarantees covering up to 80% of any losses incurred. 
9 These agencies mainly include the Commercial Representation Body, the General Organization for 
International Exhibitions and Fairs, the International Trade Point under UNCTAD's initiative, and the Egyptian 
Export Promotion Centre.  
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where y  denotes the output vector using the input x . p  and   represent the corresponding 
output and input price vectors, respectively. This ratio is however limited because output and 
input prices could vary across firms, requiring the use of more enhanced measures of TFP. 
One alternative is the multilateral productivity index introduced by Caves et al. (1982). Such 
a productivity index allows for direct comparisons between any two firm-year observations 
possible and is in the following form: 
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where ity  is the output of firm i  in period t  using the input vector itx . kitc  is the cost share of 
the input vector itx  in the total cost. 
 
Thus, firm’s TFP is computed using the deviations of its inputs and output from the reference 
situation, that is, a situation in which output and inputs represent sample geometric means and 
input cost-based shares reflect the sample arithmetic mean. This TFP measure is often used in 
the empirical literature on the relationship between exports and productivity (see, for instance, 
Aw et al., 2000; Delgado et al., 2002; Bellone et al., 2010). However, one drawback of such a 
measure is that it does not take into account the endogenous nature of the capital input. The 
reason is that firm choices on input quantities, notably those of the capital input, depend on its 
productivity (Olley & Pakes, 1996). 
 
In this study, we account for this shortcoming by using the productivity measure proposed by 
Levinsohn & Petrin (2003). The basic insight is to instrument the capital input with 
intermediate inputs. This procedure is done by estimating the following log-linear production 
function: 
 
ttmtltkt LnMLnLLnKLnY         (3) 
 
where tY ,  tK , tL , and tM  are respectively firm’s output, capital, labor and intermediate 
input in period t . Here, value added is used as the output indicator and raw material inputs are 
used as a proxy for firm’s intermediate inputs. L  and M  are assumed to be free variables, 
while K  is a state variable. ttt    is an additively separable error term including two 
components: a transmitted productivity component ( t ) and an i.i.d. component ( t ). This 
procedure allows correcting for the potential correlation between input levels and the 
unobserved firm-specific productivity shock to the production technology (Levinsohn & 
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Petrin, 2003). Unlike Olley & Pakes (1996) who use investment to control for such a 
correlation, Levinsohn & Petrin (2003) use intermediate inputs to tackle this simultaneity 
issue. In so doing, intermediate inputs are set as a function of firm’s state variables K . TFP is 
then consistently estimated using the OLS estimator of the following structural model: 
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       (4) 
 
As a robustness check, we also use the LP index, that is considered here as the value added 
per worker. 
 
4.3. The data 
We exploit data from an unbalanced panel of 1655 manufacturing firms over the period 2003-
2008 taken from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys database.10 The surveys focus on 
domestic firms having at least 10 employees. Exporter firms are defined as establishments 
that export directly, implying that firms exporting indirectly through a distributor are not 
considered as exporters.  
Table 2: distribution of exporter status across manufacturing industries 
Industries Exporters Export starter Export 
continuer 
Export 
quitter 
Non-
exporters 
N % N % N % N % N % 
Garments 138 19.22 25 3.48 70 9.75 25 3.48 580 80.78
Textiles 209 20.73 42 4.17 103 10.22 42 4.17 799 79.27
Machinery & 
equipments 
70 32.41 11 5.09 40 18.52 11 5.09 146 67.59
Chemicals  208 28.57 24 3.30 113 15.52 24 3.30 520 71.43
Electronics  50 27.17 5 2.72 23 12.50 5 2.72 134 72.83
Metal 
industries  
233 23.49 39 3.93 122 12.30 39 3.93 759 76.51
Non metal 
industries 
61 22.93 13 4.89 35 13.16 13 4.89 205 77.07
Agro 
industries 
161 25.08 18 2.80 82 12.77 18 2.80 481 74.92
Other 
industries 
293 19.48 66 4.39 145 9.64 66 4.39 1211 80.52
Total 1423 22.74 243 3.88 733 11.71 340 5.43 4835 77.26
The export dummy takes 1 if a given firm exports directly in the given year and 0 otherwise. 
The distribution of the exporter status across manufacturing industries is given in Table 2. As 
in most developing countries, there are fewer exporters (22.74%) than non-exporters 
(77.26%), although export participation varies significantly across industries. The Machinery 
& equipments and Chemicals appear to be the leading export industries, whereas Garments 
                                                 
10 This period was obtained by exploiting the information provided for the year preceding each survey year 
(2004, 2006, and 2008). The World Bank’s Enterprise Survey database is available at: 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/.  
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and Textiles are the relatively small export industries.11 Our sample includes 3.88% of export 
starters, 11.71% of export continuers, and 5.43% of export quitters, with substantial 
heterogeneity between industries. 
Table 3 provides the characteristics of exporters, starters, and continuers, as compared with 
non-exporters. Both labor productivity and total factor productivity are importantly higher for 
exporters than for non-exporters. Consistent with earlier studies comparing (see, for instance, 
Bernard and Jensen, 1995; Bernard and Wagner, 1997; Blalock and Gertler, 2004), it is clear 
that exporters tend to be larger (in terms of number of employees) and more capital intensive 
than non-exporters. Exporting firms also pay higher wages per employee, reflecting their 
higher productivity performance. On average, domestically-oriented firms experience 
relatively severe financial constraints than export-oriented firms. The former also tend to 
finance their working capital with internal funds or retained earnings, consistent with their 
limited access to external financing sources. Finally, exporters are older than non-exporting 
firms, although the difference is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 3: Comparison of exporters, starters, and continuers with non-exporters 
Means Exporters Export starters Export continuers Non-exporters
Log of employment 
Capital intensive  
Log of average wage  
Log of LP 
Log of TFP 
Financial constraint 
Internal liquidity 
Log of firm age 
5.399 (0.000) 
1475.938 (0.007) 
1.824 (0.000) 
3.402 (0.000) 
6.582 (0.000) 
0.376 (0.001) 
82.055 (0.000) 
2.894 (0.092) 
5.274 (0.000) 
1456.253 (0.040) 
2.021 (0.000) 
3.220 (0.002) 
6.619 (0.000) 
0.343 (0.047) 
81.806 (0.018) 
2.854 (0.883) 
5.441 (0.000) 
1312.116 (0.057) 
1.828 (0.000) 
3.751 (0.000) 
6.576 (0.000) 
0.357 (0.007) 
82.281 (0.000) 
2.926 (0.081) 
3.509 
366.507 
1.584 
2.803 
5.060 
0.435 
86.029 
2.846 
Notes: Mean comparison t-test for H0: difference of means=0, with p-values in parentheses. Financial constraint 
is a dummy variable defined to take 1 if the access to external financing is a major problem for their operation 
and growth. Internal liquidity is the share of working capital financed by internal funds or retained earnings.  
 
Even when we differentiate between export starters and continuers, it is apparent that they are 
also larger and more capital intensive, have higher labor productivity and total factor 
productivity than non-exporters. They are less financially constrained and rely less on internal 
funds to finance their working capital. However, because some of these firm characteristics 
are used as matching variables, we make sure that the means of firms’ characteristics do not 
differ statistically between the treated and the non-treated firms. 
These unconditional differences between exporters and non-exporters put into question a 
possible causal effect of export-market participation on productivity performance. The 
underlying issue is the determinants of these productivity differentials between exporters and 
non-exporters. These can be the result of a self-selection of more productive firms into 
exporting markets, a learning by exporting process or both. 
 
                                                 
11 This feature is consistent with the structure of the Egyptian export sector depicted in the 2005 Trade Policy 
Review (WTO, 2005). 
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4.1. Empirical specification 
In this section, we first investigate whether exporters are more productive than non-exporters, 
and then check if the anticipated productivity differential is due to a self-selection process 
or/and to the role of leaning-by-exporting. In so doing, we use a Propensity Score Matching 
approach that allows adjusting for potentially confounding firm characteristics. Here, the 
point is to match each exporters to non-exporters whose observed characteristics as similar as 
possible.  
In contrast to regression analysis, propensity score estimates are more robust to differences in 
the distributions of the confounding variables. In order to test the two alternative (but not 
mutually exclusive) hypotheses discussed above, we define two groups of exporter: export-
starters and export-continuers. Let’s consider the export-market participation dummy as 
1itExporter  if the firm i  is an export directly in period t .12 In year t , export-starters 
( tStrater ) are defined as establishments that did not export in year 1t  and export in year t .13  
Export continuers ( tContinuer ) are firms that exported in years 1t  and continue to export in 
year t . Similarly, export quitters ( tQuitter ) are defined as establishments having exported in 
year 1t  but not in year t .14 
We follow the empirical literature on the export-productivity link and specify the following 
econometric model:  
 
ittiiititit IndustryControlExporterPT   21     (5) 
 
where itPT  is the productivity indicator (in level) for firm i  in period t . In the baseline 
situation, where we just look at the export premium, itExporter  represents a dummy taking 1 
if the firm i  export in period t . 
The idea behind the self-selection is that future exporters prepare themselves to enter the 
export market so that they are expected to have a productivity boost over the period just 
before starting exporting. As for the learning effect, the point is that exporting increases firm 
performance so that firms are expected to experience a jump in productivity over the period 
following the first year of export. To test these two hypotheses we modify (5) as follows: 
 
ittiiititit IndustryControlStarterPT   21     (6) 
                                                 
12 The precision “directly” is important because in developing countries some exporters used to export through 
a distributor and therefore are much less concerned with the issue of sunk costs. As mentioned in the 
discussion above, the sunk costs are at the core of the hypothesis of self‐selection. In the survey data we will be 
using, the question on the export status is expressed as follows: What percent of your  establishment’s sales in  
2007 were (i) sold domestically, (ii) exported directly, (iii) exporter indirectly through a distributer. The responses 
indicate that 18% of total exporters were indirect exporters.  
13 This definition of export‐starters, export‐continuers and export‐quitters, is constrained by the limited time 
period, is more restrictive than that of Wagner (2002), who uses 3‐year windows. 
14 Although that is not the point in this study, we will compare the productivity of export‐continuers with that 
of export‐stoppers. An export‐stopper is defined to be firm that export in period  1t having but do not export 
in  t . 
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ittiiititit IndustryControlContinuerPT   21    (7) 
 
Here, itPT  is the growth of the productivity indicator for firm i  between 1t  and t . 
Consistent with above definitions, (6) and (7) allow testing the presence of self-selection and 
learning effects, respectively. To consistently identify the export premium as well as the pre-
and post-entry premia, we make use of propensity score matching method. To evaluate the 
export status effect of productivity, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT) in the following way: 
 
]1|[]1|[ 01  iiii ExporterPTEExporterPTEATT      (8) 
 
where 1| iià ExporterPT  is the productivity level the firm i  would have if it had been a non-
exporter and 1|1 ii ExporterPT  its actual level. The selection and learning effects are then 
given, respectively, by: 
 
]1|[]1|[ 01  iiiis StarterPTEStarterPTEATT      (9) 
]1|[]1|[ 01  iiiis ContinuerPTEContinuerPTEATT     (10) 
 
However, one fundamental problem in this evaluation is that 1|0 ii ExporterPT  is not 
observable. The export premium would be contaminated if the export decision is not random. 
In the case where the decision to export is correlated with observable factors such as internal 
liquidity, employment and wages, the so-called “selection on observables” problem arises. To 
account for this problem, we use the propensity score matching procedure. The treatment 
effects given in (8) can therefore be rewritten as follows: 
 
)]( ,1|[)]( ,1|[ 01 iiiiii XpExporterPTEXpExporterPTEATT     (11) 
 
where X  is a set of observable covariates and )(Xp is the propensity score generated from a 
Logit estimate of the probability of exporting, conditional on X . X  includes the log of 
employment, the log of average wage (as a proxy of firm’s human capital), the firm financial 
health and the log of firm age. We also control for the localization in an industrial zone, thus 
accounting for horizontal integration and therefore for any regional positive externalities. 
Indeed, the presence in an industrial zone can improve the likelihood of exporting because the 
concentration of exporters in such a zone generates positive externalities to others firms. The 
one-period lagged values of covariates are used to alleviate potential endogeneity on the 
estimation of the propensity score. The export premium, defined as the ceteris paribus 
productivity difference (in percentage) between exporters and non-exporters is given by: 
]1)[exp(100 ATT . 
 
To test the hypothesis of self-selection, we compare the productivity performances between 
today’s exporters and non-exporters, one year before starting to export, controlling for firm 
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characteristics included in X . Similarly, the hypothesis of learning-by-exporting is tested by 
computing the productivity differential between today’s exporters and their counterparts 
which do no export during the year after entering the foreign market, controlling for 
conditioning information included in X . More formally,  
 
)]( ,1|[)]( ,1|[ 1 iiiàiiis XpStarterPTEXpStarterPTEATT     (9) 
)]( ,1|[)]( ,1|[ 1 iiiàiiis XpContinuerPTEXpContinuerPTEATT    (10) 
 
We use the nearest neighbor matching with replacement, consisting in matching each treated 
firm with control firms that experience the closest propensity score. The algorithm of Becker 
and Ichino (2002) was used to make sure that the matching was successful. The difference in 
means of firms’ characteristics is not statistically different between treated and control units. 
In addition, we make sure of the validity of the common support condition by dropping 
treated units with a propensity score higher than the maximum or lower than the minimum 
propensity score of the control units. 
 
4.2. Estimating the propensity scores 
The results of Logit regressions to generate the propensity score are reported in Table 4, when 
simply using the export dummy as the treatment variable. The results that use the export 
starter and export continuer dummies as the treatment variables are presented in Tables A1 
and A2 in the appendix. In Table 4, the values of the Pseudo-R-squares—ranging from 28.7% 
to 32.1%—suggest that the Logit regressions fit the data well (see Domencich and McFadden 
(1975) and Louviere et al. (2000) for detailed discussion on goodness-of-fit tests).15  
In the baseline specification, we simply control for the log of employment, the log of average 
wage, the log of firm age, the share of working capital and new investments financed by 
internal funds or retained earnings, and a dummy variable indicating if the firm has a 
department specialized in research and development. As shown in Table 3, firms that export 
tend to hire more, to pay more, and are older than non-exporters. They do not rely heavily on 
internal funds to finance working capital and new investments. In addition, exporters typically 
spend more than domestically-oriented firms to finance research and development activities.
                                                 
15 The same picture is observed in Tables A1 and A2, when the export starter and export continuer dummy 
variables are used as the treatment variables (see the appendix). 
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Table 4: Logit estimates of the propensity scores 
Dependent variable   =1 if exporter  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of employment  
 
Log of average wage  
 
Log of age  
 
R&D  
 
Internal liquidity  
 
Localization in an industrial zone 
 
Log of employment (squared) 
 
Log of age (squared) 
 
Constant 
 
0.516*** 
(0.032) 
0.070** 
(0.035) 
-0.183*** 
(0.066) 
0.696*** 
(0.110) 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.585*** 
(0.274) 
0.527*** 
(0.033) 
0.071** 
(0.035) 
-0.181*** 
(0.067) 
0.649*** 
(0.112) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.392*** 
(0.294) 
0.497*** 
(0.033) 
0.054 
(0.036) 
0.059 
(0.074) 
0.604*** 
(0.113) 
0.004** 
(0.001) 
1.001*** 
(0.108) 
 
 
 
 
-4.286*** 
(0.324) 
1.228*** 
(0.167) 
0.052 
(0.036) 
0.098 
(0.074) 
0.578*** 
(0.112) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.932*** 
(0.109) 
-0.072*** 
(0.016) 
 
 
-5.950*** 
(0.502) 
0.408*** 
(0.052) 
0.106* 
(0.036) 
0.664* 
(0.368) 
0.602*** 
(0.113) 
0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.977*** 
(0.108) 
 
 
-0.108* 
(0.064) 
-5.097*** 
(0.588) 
0.643*** 
(0.044) 
0.105** 
(0.047) 
-0.039 
(0.094) 
0.684*** 
(0.134) 
0.005*** 
(0.002) 
0.999*** 
(0.135) 
 
 
 
 
-5.224*** 
(0.414) 
Sector-Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of obs. 
Pseudo R2 
2831 
0.153 
2831 
0.158 
2828 
0.186 
2828 
0.193 
2828 
0.187 
 
 
2092 
0.253 
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All of the explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
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The propensity score is estimated using a Logit model to limit the problem of disproportionate 
sampling.16 Most estimated coefficients show the expected signs. As anticipated, we find that 
firms with higher levels employment and higher wages are likely to be exporters. It is worth 
noting, however, that the level of employment can affect the likelihood of exporting in 
opposite directions. On the one hand, since we are in a less developed setting, firms with 
relatively high employees can exploit the comparative advantage in labor and export in 
countries with higher levels of unit labor cost. This leads to a positive association between the 
level of employment and the probability to export. On the other hand, firms with a high 
number of employees can perform poorly due to diminishing returns to labor in production, 
potentially leading to a negative association between the employment level and the likelihood 
of exporting. 
The coefficient on firm age is negative and statistically significant, possibly reflecting the 
nonmonotonic association between the firm age and the export decision. Indeed, as for the 
level of employment, the effect of the firm age on the probability of exporting may be, a 
priori, ambiguous. In effect, although firm age can increase the likelihood of exporting at 
lowest levels of age, it can also negatively affect the likelihood of exporting as the firm 
becomes older and do not innovate. This is particularly the case in lesser developed 
economies. To control for this, we include the log of firm age along with its squared term in 
the Specification 6 (column 6). 
Furthermore, the internal financial health positively influences the probability to export, 
signaling the importance of link between financial factors and firm export behavior (see for 
instance Blalock & Roy, 2007; Manova, 2008; Bellone et al., 2010; Minetti & Zhu, 2011). 
Consistent with Wagner (2007), firms with a department specialized in research & 
development tend to make decision to sell abroad. While the baseline specification accounts 
for the main factors explaining the probability to export (Column 1), we nevertheless check 
the robustness of the baseline results to a number of sensitivity tests. We first control for 
industry-level heterogeneity to allow for productivity differentials across industries in the 
matching (Column 2). We then account for the localization in an industrial zone (Column 3), 
the squared values of employment and firm age (Columns 4-5), potential outliers (Column 6).  
The regression estimates are not also sensitive to dropping the most influential firms. These 
firms are those for which the Cook’s distance is greater than the conventional cut-off point 
4/N, with N the number of observations. The Cook’s distance is derived from a regression of 
a log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function. 
                                                 
16 Unlike of the Probit model, the estimation of the coefficients of the regressor variables using a Logit model is 
not affected by the unequal sampling rates for exporters and non exporters (Maddala, 1992). This problem is 
frequent in large firm‐level datasets, particularly when the number of observation in one groups if is much 
larger than the number of in the other group. In our case, as it is mostly the case in developing economies, the 
number of exporters appears to be much smaller than the number of non‐exporters. 
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We further test the sensitivity of these results by using the two and three-nearest-neighbor 
matching estimators. This does not alter the statistical significance of the treatment effect and 
the magnitude of the export premium.17 
 
4.2. Are exporters more productive than non-exporters? 
The results on productivity differentials between exporters and non-exporters are reported in 
Table 5. We present the ATT and the derived export premium. In the baseline specification, 
the results strongly support the idea that exporting firms are more productive than their 
domestically-oriented counterparts. The LP is almost 46% greater for exporters than their 
more insulated domestic counterparts. Similarly, TFP is about 63% higher for exporters than 
for domestically-oriented firms. These results are consistent with the picture of earlier studies 
on the link between exports and productivity. The exporter productivity premium is robust to 
augmenting the baseline specification of the propensity score estimates with additional 
covariates. All these additional factors do not alter the statistical significance of the treatment 
effect.  
 
Another result is that the export premium is far larger for TFP than for LP. This signals that 
export-market participation is proportionately more associated with the capital productivity 
than with the labor productivity. In the case of the self-selection hypothesis, this suggests that 
future exporters need to increase relative more the productivity of their capital than that of 
their labor. In contrast, if the export premium is driven by the learning hypothesis, this would 
suggest that exporting firms improve relatively more the capital productivity than the labor 
productivity after they enter foreign markets. In both hypotheses, this picture is quite 
consistent with the situation of the developing economies where the capital factor is relative 
less abundant than labor and where exporting requires relatively capital intensive technology. 
 
Consistent with the spirit of Greenaway and Kneller (2007), we control for industry 
differences in the export premium by including industry dummies. Not surprisingly, this 
decreases the export premium by 2.64 and 1.83 percentage points, respectively for LP and 
TFP. The obvious explanation is that exporters are concentrated in different industries than 
non-exporters and reflects the difference of productivity differentials between industries, but 
this does not alter the statistical significance of the treatment effect. In contrast, taking into 
account the localization of the firm in an industrial zone leads to an increase of the export 
premium, signaling the fact that exporting firms locating in an industrial zone tend to be 
above the average in terms of productivity performance.  
                                                 
17 Results are not presented but available upon request. 
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Controlling for the localization in an industrial zone also makes the treatment effect less clear-
cut, but leaves its significance unchanged. The export premium decreases by 4.67 and 14.59 
percentage points for the LP and the TFP, suggesting that the export premium is lower for 
firms located in industrial zones than for others. This is quite intuitive because as mentioned 
above, the localization in an industrial zone can be regarded as a factor generating positive 
externalities from exporters to non-exporters. 
Similarly, accounting for the squared terms of employment and firm age reduces the export 
premium, relative to the specification (4), but does not alter its significance. Interestingly, this 
reveals the nonmonotone nature of the relation between firm employment and age and the 
propensity to export. Employment has a positive and significant effect on the likelihood to 
export, but at a decreasing rate. At lower levels, employment increases the probability to 
export but no longer beyond a certain threshold level of employment (Table 4, column 5).  
Table 5: Export premium 
 
 
Average treatment 
effect on the treated 
Export premium (%)  
LP TFP LP TFP Number of observations 
Baseline specification (1) 
Exporter dummy 0.360*** 
(0.123) 
0.480*** 
(0.157) 
43.422 61.715 Treated= 285 
Untreated=752 
(1) and controlling for the industry-level differences (2) 
Exporter dummy 0.329*** 
(0.164) 
0.514*** 
(0.146) 
39.022 67.335 Treated= 285 
Untreated=752 
(2) and controlling for the localization in an industrial zone (3) 
Exporter dummy 
 
0.317** 
(0.134) 
0.517*** 
(0.136) 
37.376 67.854 Treated= 285 
Untreated= 751 
(2) and controlling for the squared term of employment (4) 
Exporter dummy 
 
0.288** 
(0.138) 
0.446*** 
(0.160) 
33.447 
 
56.248 
 
Treated= 285 
Untreated= 751 
(2) and controlling for the squared term of firm age (5) 
Exporter dummy 
 
0.313** 
(0.120) 
0.462*** 
(0.143) 
36.802 58.775 Treated= 285 
Untreated= 751 
(2) and controlling for potential outliers (6) 
Exporter dummy 
 
0.248*** 
(0.138) 
0.430*** 
(0.134) 
28.204 53.739 Treated=585 
Untreated=1497 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors for the ATT, using 50 replications are reported in parenthesis. Standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. Industry-level differences are controlled for by adding dummy variables for 
the following industries: garments, textiles, machinery & equipments, chemicals, electronics, metal industries, 
nonmetal industries, agro industries, and other industries. 
 
This result was also found by Wagner (2007) on a comparable study for 14 countries. As for 
the firm age, the likelihood of exporting is also increasing with firm age up to a threshold 
level beyond where the sign of this association changes (Table 4, column 5). Finally, we 
control for the potential effect of outliers by running a regression of a log-linear Cobb-
Douglas production function and dropping firms for which the Cook’s distance is greater than 
the conventional cut-off point 4/N, with N the number of observations. This also reduces the 
export premium, compared with that of the Specification (4). But, once again, the main result 
remains statistically significant at the 1 percent level. The result on the relative importance of 
the export premium for the TFP than for the LP also continues to hold after applying these 
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robustness tests. To sum up, the bottom line is therefore that Egyptian exporting firms 
perform better than their domestically-oriented counterparts.  
 
4.2. Do firms self-select into foreign markets or/and learn from exporting? 
In this section, we want to explain the exporter productivity premium find the previous 
subsection. To this end, we next differentiate between export-starters and export-continuers to 
test the self-selection hypothesis against the idea of the learning-by-exporting. The selection 
hypothesis is tested by comparing the productivity performance of export-starters and non-
exporter in the period just before the export-starter enter the export market (pre-entry 
premium). For the hypothesis of learning from exporting, we compare the performance of 
export-continuers and non-exporters one year after continuers start to export (post-entry 
premium). The results are presented in Table 6. For each specification, we report both the pre- 
and post-entry premia, using the growth of LP and TFP as the outcome variable.  
The results in the baseline specification clearly suggest that hypothesis that the productivity 
increases prior to exporting is not statistically significant. In contrast, the leaning effect is 
relatively more important, signaling that the export premium found in Table 5 is driven by the 
learning-by-exporting hypothesis. The treatment effect is much larger for the post-entry 
premium than for the pre-entry premium. The former is also statistically significant at any 
level of significance, while the latter is always insignificant.  
The coefficients on the post-entry treatment effect indicate that LP grew 152.77% faster for 
exporter-continuers, one year after entering the export market, as compared with non-
exporters. Similarly, exporting significantly and importantly increases the TFP. TFP growth is 
almost 123.05% higher for export-continuers than for firms producing for domestic markets 
only. Once again, however, TFP growth is not statistically different between export-starters 
and non-exporters. After controlling for the industry-level heterogeneity, the same picture 
remains, though the post-entry premium decreases by 38.16% and 23.05%, respectively for 
LP and TFP (Specification 2).  
Also, the post-entry treatment effect becomes weaker when controlling for the localization in 
an industrial zone but its statistical significance remains unchanged (Specification 3). More 
interestingly, this leaning effect continues to be significant and economically large, even after 
further controlling for the squared terms of employment and firm age and potential outliers 
(Specifications 4, 5, and 6). The post-entry premium becomes insignificant only when we 
include the square term of employment. Nevertheless, we do not regard this as a rejection of 
the learning hypothesis because in such a case, we control for the nonmonotone association 
between employment and the likelihood to export. The focus is therefore more on the 
significance of the coefficients on employment and its squared term in the equation of the 
probability to export.   
On average, the learning effect in Egypt is much larger than that commonly found in other 
developing countries, but more advanced countries. This definitely suggests that the more the 
economy is developed, the weaker will be the leaning effect. The extreme case is the situation 
of OECD developed countries for which there might be no evidence of learning from 
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exporting. This strong evidence of the learning from exporting hypothesis may be the result of 
the technical assistance of Egyptian exporters by foreign buyers. It can also be the reflection 
of the more intensive competition in international markets. 
In contrast, the pre-entry treatment effect remains statistically insignificant, even after 
augmenting the baseline specification with additional conditioning information. A possible 
explanation of this insignificant export premium is that future exporters tend to hire more and 
export the relatively abundant production factor.  
 
Table 6: Export premium: Pre-entry vs. Post entry 
 Average treatment 
effect on the treated 
Export premium (%) Number of 
observations 
LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP 
Baseline specification (1) 
Pre-entry 
 
0.164 
(0.245) 
0.411 
(0.266) 
- 
 
- Treated=120 
Untreated=622 
Post-entry 0.617*** 
(0.222) 
1.058*** 
(0.263) 
85.424 188.115 Treated=165 
Untreated=622 
(1) and controlling for the industry-level differences (2) 
Pre-entry 
 
0.061 
(0.269) 
0.221 
(0.285) 
- - Treated=120 
Untreated=607 
Post-entry 0.588** 
(0.275) 
0.668*** 
(0.243) 
80.043 95.108 Treated=165 
Untreated=622 
(2) and controlling for the localization  in an industrial zone (3) 
Pre-entry 
 
0.140 
(0.252) 
0.356 
(0.313) 
- - Treated=120 
Untreated=607 
Post-entry 0.468* 
(0.266) 
0.702** 
(0.305) 
59.714 101.943 Treated=165 
Untreated=622 
(3) and controlling for the square term of employment (4) 
Pre-entry 
 
-0.049 
(0.269) 
0.301 
(0.268) 
- 
 
- 
 
Treated= 120 
Untreated= 607 
Post-entry 0.397* 
(0.204) 
0.816** 
(0.319) 
48.846 126.292 Treated=165 
Untreated=622 
(4) and controlling for the square term of firm age (5) 
Pre-entry 
 
0.125 
(0.261) 
0.231 
(0.213) 
- - Treated= 120 
Untreated= 607 
Post-entry 0.440* 
(0.231) 
0.685*** 
(0.226) 
55.413 98.431 Treated=165 
Untreated=622 
(4) and controlling for potential outliers (6) 
Pre-entry 
 
-0.126 
(0.199) 
0.199 
(0.259) 
- - Treated=117 
Untreated=584 
Post-entry 0.468* 
(0.257) 
0.529** 
(0.232) 
59.696 69.760 Treated=157 
Untreated=596 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors for the ATT, using 50 replications are reported in parenthesis. Standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. Industry-level differences is controlled for by adding dummy variables for 
the following industries: garments, textiles, machinery & equipments, chemicals, electronics, metal industries, 
nonmetal industries, agro industries, and other industries. 
 
In short, the big picture is that in Egypt, the export premium is clearly driven by the leaning 
from exporting rather than by the selection of more productive firms into export markets. This 
is consistent with the picture commonly found in lesser developed economies. The learning 
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effect for Egyptian exporters found here is far larger than that found in relatively more 
developed economies. 
These results do not necessarily call into question the idea of the importance of sunk costs in 
developing countries. One plausible explanation is that future exporters overcome the sunk 
costs of entering into exporting by benefiting from technology transfer from foreign buyers 
The immediate implication of the evidence for leaning rather than self-selection is that the 
technical assistance of overseas buyers solves the problem of the sunk costs, which is at the 
origin of the self-selection. Another possible explanation is the role of financial constraints. 
Indeed, the problem of access to financial services appears to be more important than that of 
the sunk costs.  
4.3. Does export destination matter for the selection process 
In the previous subsection, we found strong evidence for learning-by-exporting and little 
evidence of self-selection into export markets. In this subsection, we explain why the pre-
entry premium is not significant by differentiating the destinations between OECD countries 
and Non-OECD countries. 
 
The underlying idea is that whereas exporters need to increase their productivity to be able to 
exports toward Non-OECD countries, they do not necessarily self-select into OECD 
countries. The reason is that they benefit from technical expertise of OECD importers. This 
technology transfer from OECD buyers to lesser developed countries sellers is likely to 
overcome the sunk costs of entry export markets, thereby making unnecessary the self-
selection. In contrast, lesser developed countries future exporters do need to self-select into 
Non-OECD countries because they do not benefit from substantial technical assistance from 
these countries.  
 
The results are presented in Table 7, which reports the same specifications as in Tables 5 and 
6. The results strongly support our presumption. In the baseline specification, as anticipated, 
the ATT is statistically significant for the pre-entry in Non-OECD countries but insignificant 
for the pre-entry in OECD countries. The value of the ATT suggests an economically 
substantial pre-entry premium in Non-OECD countries, even if this premium remains lower 
than the post-entry premium found in the baseline specification of Table 6. Future export-
starters in Non-OECD markets increase their productivity relative to non-exporters by 64.84% 
and 41.85%, respectively for LP and TFP (Specification 1).  
 
With few exceptions, this picture remains unchanged, even after controlling for additional 
factors. The export premium for the pre-entry in OECD countries remains insignificant even 
after controlling for industry differences, the localization in an industrial zone, the square 
terms of employment and age, and potential outliers (Specifications 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6). As for 
the pre-entry in Non-OECD countries, the self-selection effect is important in most cases. 
When controlling for industry differences, the pre-entry premium increases by 0.09 and 0.10 
percentage points, respectively for LP and TFP. However, after accounting for the localization 
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in an industrial zone, the export pre-entry premium decreases by 0.10 percentage points for 
TFP, though LP substantial increases.  
 
Similarly, taking account of the square term of employment and potential outliers increases 
the pre-entry premium, even if controlling for the square term of age reduces it. These results, 
therefore, clearly point to the level of development of export destinations as the reason why 
we find no evidence that firm self-select into export markets. 
 
Table 7: Export destinations and the self-selection process 
 Average treatment 
effect on the treated 
Export premium (%) Number of 
observations 
LP TFP LP TFP LP TFP 
Baseline specification (1) 
Pre-entry in OECD countries 
 
-0.317 
(0.473) 
0.283 
(0.477) 
- 
 
- Treated=37 
Untreated=1000 
Pre-entry in Non-OECD 
countries 
0.493*** 
(0.157) 
0.349* 
(0.185) 
63.847 
 
41.859 Treated=83 
Untreated=954 
(1) and controlling for the industry-level differences (2) 
Pre-entry in OECD countries 
 
0.483 
(0.446) 
0.300 
(0.470) 
- - Treated=37 
Untreated=944 
Pre-entry in Non-OECD 
countries 
0.272 
(0.210) 
0.450** 
(0.203) 
- 
 
56.937 Treated=83 
Untreated=856 
(1) and controlling for the localization in an industrial zone (3) 
Pre-entry in OECD countries 
 
0.414 
(0.467) 
-7.48e-04 
(0.416) 
- - Treated=37 
Untreated=943 
Pre-entry in Non-OECD 
countries 
0.362** 
(0.158) 
0.348* 
(0.184) 
43.748 41.749 Treated=83 
Untreated=856 
(1) and controlling for the square term of employment (4) 
Pre-entry in OECD countries 
 
0.151 
(0.525) 
0.559 
(0.405) 
- 
 
- 
 
Treated=37 
Untreated=943 
Pre-entry in Non-OECD 
countries 
0.427** 
(0.179) 
0.513*** 
(0.207) 
53.304 
 
67.188 
 
Treated=83 
Untreated=856 
(1) and controlling for the square term of firm age (5) 
Pre-entry in OECD countries 
 
0.485 
(0.437) 
0.466 
(0.371) 
- - Treated=37 
Untreated=943 
Pre-entry in Non-OECD 
countries 
0.182 
(0.174) 
0.349* 
(0.191) 
- 41.869 Treated=83 
Untreated=856 
(1) and controlling for potential outliers (6) 
Pre-entry in OECD countries 
 
-0.164 
(0.503) 
0.065 
(0.461) 
- - Treated=37 
Untreated=941 
Pre-entry in Non-OECD 
countries 
0.422** 
(0.183) 
0.569*** 
(0.202) 
52.572 76.814 Treated=82 
Untreated=855 
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors for the ATT, using 50 replications are reported in parenthesis. Standard 
errors are presented in parentheses. Industry-level differences are controlled for by adding dummy variables for 
the following industries: garments, textiles, machinery & equipments, chemicals, electronics, metal industries, 
nonmetal industries, agro industries, and other industries. 
 
4.3. The learning from exporting in a continuous treatment framework 
The results reported so far suggest that exporting increases productivity through a learning 
from exporting rather than a self-selection of better-performing firms into export markets. But 
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an underlying fundamental question remains: considering the subpopulation of exporters, to 
what extent exporting increases firm performance? In other words, what is the effect of export 
intensity (export to output, in percentage) on firm productivity?   
 
We explore the impact of exporting on firm productivity at each export to output ratio in the 
interval zero to one hundred. In so doing, we make use of the generalized propensity score 
(GPS) procedure developed by Imbens (2000) and Hirano and Imbens (2004) and adopted by 
Fryges and Wagner (2008) and Fryges (2009) to study the export-productivity relationship in 
Germany and the UK. Instead of using the firm’s export status as a binary treatment, the GPS 
method is designed for analyzing the effect of a treatment intensity, that is, in our case, the 
firm’s export intensity. The advantage of such an approach is that it allows for continuous 
treatment, thus estimating a dose-response function describing the conditional expectation of 
firm productivity given the level of export intensity and the GPS.  
 
Although the export to output ratio is randomly distributed, it is potentially correlated with 
firm characteristics and productivity performance. To remove such a bias, we make the weak 
unconfoundedness assumption suggesting that conditional on covariates, export intensity is 
independent of firm productivity.18 In estimating the conditional distribution of the treatment 
variable, we use the same set of covariates used previously to estimate the propensity scores.  
 
This set of covariates includes the log of employment, the log of average wage, the log of firm 
age, the share of working capital and new investments financed by internal funds or retained 
earnings, and dummy variables indicating if the firm has a department specialized in research 
and development and if the firm is located in an industrial zone. In line with the binary 
treatment propensity scores estimated previously, we also include industry dummies to 
remove the potential omitted variables bias associated with differences in the degree of 
vertical integration and capital intensity.   
 
The estimated dose-response functions are presented in Figures 1 and 2, respectively for LP 
and TFP. These figures show an inverted U-shaped relationship between export intensity and 
firm productivity, both for LP and TFP. The results do not support the presence of multiple 
waves in the relationship between firm’s export intensity and their labor productivity, as 
suggested in the international management literature (see, for instance, Hitt et al. 1994; 
Sullivan 1994; Riahi-Belkaoui 1998). In contrast, the results are in line with the findings by 
Fryges and Wagner (2008) and Fryges (2009).19 
                                                 
18 Hirano and Imbens (2004) show that the GPS can be used to eliminate any biases associated with differences 
in the covariates. 
19 In the international business literature, Geringer et al. (1989) and Gomes and Ramaswamy (1999), for 
example, also find a similar picture. 
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Figure 1: Estimated dose-response function using the labor productivity 
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Figure 2: Estimated dose-response function using the total factor productivity 
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The estimated maximum of the inverted U-shaped relationship between export intensity and 
LP is reached at 55.33%, a level at which the expected value of LP is 3.84 (logarithmic 
value). This maximum level of LP is substantially higher than the level of LP of non-
exporting firms (2.98). As for TFP, the maximum value is reached at an export intensity of 
31.76%. At this level of export intensity, the expected value of TFP is 4.39. The level of TFP 
of non-exporters is 3.54, indicating a productivity differential of 46.17 (non-logarithmic 
value), as compared with the maximum value of TFP.20 
 
Even firms exporting beyond the threshold of internationalization experience higher 
productivity levels, as compared with non-exporting firms. The lowest levels of productivity 
are 3.18 and 3.78, while productivity levels of non-exporters are 2.98 and 3.54, respectively 
for LP and TFP. The decreasing rate of the positive effect of export intensity on productivity 
reflects the exposure to adverse shocks (foreign exchange risks, for example) beyond the 
threshold of internationalization. Another possible explanation is related to the costs of 
coordination and control of foreign engagement (see Fryges and Wagner, 2008). Indeed, 
increasing levels of the export to output ratio improve firm productivity, but only up to a 
certain threshold of exporting beyond which the marginal benefit begins to outweigh the 
benefits which begin to decelerate, while costs decelerate. 
 
Here, the big picture is therefore that not only exporters are more productive than non-
exporters, but the extent of firm’s involvement in export markets also matters.  
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Although previous studies on the relationship between exports and productivity describe the 
superior productivity performance of exporters, as compared with non-exporters, there is still 
a hotly debated research issue on the reason of this productivity differential. Whereas most 
studies of more developed countries point to the self-selection as the source of the export 
premium, more recent studies using samples from poorest economies find evidence for the 
learning effect. 
 
We re-examine this relationship using data from the Egyptian manufacturing industry and 
propensity score matching methods. We find that exporters are much more productive than 
their domestically-oriented counterparts. The export-premium is about 35.12% for LP and 
33.50% for TFP. When we differentiate between pre-entry and post-entry differences in 
productivity performance and even after controlling for additional confounding factors, the 
results indicate that productivity is not significantly higher for export-starters than for non-
exporters. In contrast, post-entry differences in LP and TFP between exporters and non-
exporters are robust and statistically significant. Another point is that export intensity and 
destinations matter for firm productivity, signaling a potential gain from policy intervention. 
 
These findings suggest that unlike in developed countries, firms in developing and emerging 
countries learn much from exporting. Hence, barriers to international trade can strongly 
                                                 
20 The logarithmic value 46.17=exp(4.39)‐exp(3.54). 
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constrain productivity performance and growth of firms in developing countries. Export-
oriented strategies that meet market rules could have strong beneficial effects on private 
sector productivity. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Logit estimates of the propensity score 
Dependent variable   =1 if export-starter  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of employment  
 
Log of average wage  
 
Log of age  
 
R&D  
 
Internal liquidity  
 
Localization in an industrial zone 
 
Log of employment (squared) 
 
Log of age (squared) 
 
Constant 
 
0.306*** 
(0.053) 
-0.047 
(0.065) 
-0.039 
(0.109) 
0.151 
(0.224) 
8.44e-04 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.363*** 
(0.434) 
0.339*** 
(0.055) 
-0.038 
(0.067) 
-0.052 
(0.110) 
0.111 
(0.230) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-3.215*** 
(0.470) 
0.303*** 
(0.056) 
-0.066 
(0.070) 
0.205* 
(0.124) 
-0.019 
(0.232) 
8.05e-04 
(0.002) 
1.134*** 
(0.180) 
 
 
 
 
-4.154 
(0.525) 
0.452 
(0.281) 
-0.064 
(0.070) 
0.212* 
(0.124) 
-0.020 
(0.231) 
8.85e-04 
(0.002) 
1.118*** 
(0.182) 
-0.015 
(0.029) 
 
 
-4.472*** 
(0.788) 
0.319*** 
(0.057) 
-0.056 
(0.070) 
1.667** 
(0.789) 
-0.010 
(0.233) 
8.39e-04 
(0.002) 
1.088*** 
(0.181) 
 
 
-0.257* 
(0.135) 
-6.166*** 
(1.223) 
0.594*** 
(0.089) 
0.215** 
(0.101) 
-0.032 
(0.195) 
0.181 
(0.321) 
7.84e-04 
(0.004) 
0.807*** 
(0.290) 
 
 
 
 
-5.707*** 
(0.803) 
Sector-Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of obs. 
Pseudo R2 
2065 
0.035 
2029 
0.051 
2027 
0.085 
2827 
0.085 
2027 
0.089 
 
 
1474 
0.157 
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All of the explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
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Table A2: Logit estimates of the propensity score 
Dependent variable   =1 if export-continuer  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Log of employment  
 
Log of average wage  
 
Log of age  
 
R&D  
 
Internal liquidity  
 
Localization in an industrial zone 
 
Log of employment  
 
Log of age  
 
Constant 
 
0.793*** 
(0.044) 
0.117*** 
(0.042) 
-0.349*** 
(0.082) 
1.193*** 
(0.132) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-5.071*** 
(0.350) 
0.810*** 
(0.045) 
0.117*** 
(0.042) 
-0.346*** 
(0.083) 
1.152*** 
(0.135) 
0.007** 
(0.002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-4.773*** 
(0.373) 
0.784*** 
(0.045) 
0.095** 
(0.044) 
-0.078 
(0.092) 
1.123*** 
(0.137) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
1.094*** 
(0.138) 
 
 
 
 
-5.785*** 
(0.415) 
2.108*** 
(0.235) 
0.093** 
(0.044) 
-0.014 
(0.093) 
1.086*** 
(0.136) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
0.980*** 
(0.138) 
-0.129*** 
(0.021) 
 
 
-8.925*** 
(0.713) 
0.797*** 
(0.046) 
0.100** 
(0.044) 
0.785* 
(0.429) 
1.127*** 
(0.137) 
0.007*** 
(0.002) 
1.050*** 
(0.139) 
 
 
-0.157** 
(0.075) 
-6.922*** 
(0.703) 
0.823*** 
(0.054) 
0.104** 
(0.052) 
-0.145 
(0.108) 
1.140*** 
(0.156) 
0.008*** 
(0.002) 
1.097*** 
(0.159) 
 
 
 
 
-5.922*** 
(0.486) 
Sector-Fixed Effects NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Number of obs. 
Pseudo R2 
2407 
0.301 
2407 
0.308 
2405 
0.334 
2405 
0.348 
2405 
0.336 
 
 
1838 
0.357 
Notes: Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All of the explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
 
 
 
